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From late 2010 until spring 2014, the Caballeros Templarios drug cartel was the de-facto 
ruler of the Mexican state of Michoacán. This thesis will show how, through the use of a 
powerful narrative, the Caballeros Templarios were able to supplant both rival cartels and 
legitimate government authorities. They successfully evolved from a small criminal 
group into Mexico’s first true net-warlords. Using netwar and organizational design 
theory, this thesis will describe the structure of the Templarios, their doctrinal and 
ideological characteristics, and the implications these have for Mexico and the drug war 
writ large. The primary conclusion of this thesis is that the Caballeros Templarios applied 
principles characteristic of netwar to create a criminal parallel state, directly threatening 
the sovereignty of the Mexican state of Michoacán. Ultimately, recognizing the causes 
and nature of this kind of threat will guide development of effective security strategies for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
From late 2010 until spring 2014, the Caballeros Templarios drug cartel was the 
de-facto ruler of the Mexican state of Michoacán.1 This thesis will show how, through the 
use of a powerful narrative, the Caballeros Templarios were able to supplant both rival 
cartels and legitimate government authorities. They successfully evolved from a small 
criminal group into Mexico’s first true net-warlords. The primary conclusion of this 
thesis is that the Caballeros Templarios applied principles characteristic of netwar to 
create a criminal parallel state, directly threatening the sovereignty of the state of 
Michoacán. Ultimately, recognizing the causes and nature of this kind of threat will guide 
development of effective security strategies for both the United States and Mexico. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Extreme violence related to the war on drugs is now commonplace in many parts 
of Mexico with authorities at the local and national level frequently either powerless to 
stop it, or proactive participants in the crimes.2 Despite similarities to the counter-cartel 
fights occurring in other parts of the country, the conflict in the Mexican state of 
Michoacán is distinct. In contrast to the more traditional law enforcement struggle against 
other drug cartels, the battle in Michoacán resembles a criminal insurgency. By this, we 
mean that no other part of Mexico has seen such a strong push by a criminal group to 
control so many aspects of civil society.3  
In this region, there is one dominant criminal organization: Los Caballeros 
Templarios.4 Regardless of numerous attempts by the government and criminal rivals to 
                                                 
1 Catherine E. Shoichet, “Notorious Mexican Cartel Leader Nazario Moreno Dead—Again,” CNN, 
March 11, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/09/world/americas/mexico-drug-lord-nazario-moreno-
killed/ 
2 Dudley Althaus and Steven Dudley, “Mexico’s Security Dilemma: The Rise of Michoacán’s 
Militias,” In Sight Crime-Organized Crime in the Americas, April 30 2014, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/mexico-security-rise-militias-michoacan  
3 Tracy Wilkinson, “In the Hot Land, Mexicans Just Say No to Drug Cartels” Los Angeles Times, June 
11, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/11/world/la-fg-mexico-hotland-20130611  
4 Paul Rexton Kan, Cartels at War: Mexico’s Drug Fueled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National 
Security (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2012), Kindle edition, 44–45. 
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B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to address how the narrative of the Caballeros 
Templarios, and its subsequent effect on the group’s behavior and organization, enabled 
them to evolve into a cohesive netwar actor.  Using netwar theory and organizational 
modeling, this thesis will describe the structure of the Templarios, their doctrinal and 
ideological characteristics and the implications these have for Mexico, as well as how to 
address similar struggles in the future. 
The period examined in this study is from fall 2010 until spring 2014. This will 
limit the analysis to the period from when the group first emerged as a distinct entity, 
through the rise of a regional counter-movement, resulting in the cartel’s defeat.6 Within 
this time frame it is possible to show from start to finish how advanced netwar 
techniques, specifically a powerful narrative, can transform a normal criminal group into 
a powerful regional warlord. 
C. KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS 
The key concepts used in this thesis are the netwar theories by John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt, the organizational design models of Henry Mintzberg and William Evan, 
and Jay Galbraith’s star model technique for addressing organizational capabilities. These 
methods allow the Caballeros Templarios’s behavior and strategy to be explained, 
visualized, and understood in detail. In addition, building on the work of Robert Bunker 
and John Sullivan, we will show how this group evolved into a sophisticated and highly 
networked warlord-like entity.  
                                                 
5 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2011), Kindle edition, loc 175–209. 




1. Netwar and Organizational Models 
In their 1996 work, The Advent of Netwar, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
define netwar as “an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, involving 
measures short of war, in which protagonist use—indeed, depend on using—network 
forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and communication.”7 These four vital factors 
(organization, doctrine, strategy, and communication) allow individuals and groups 
shaped by the modern information age to achieve a synergy, which was heretofore 
difficult to achieve. Netwar actors leverage modern communication strategies and 
technology along with unique organizational design elements in an effort to outperform 
adversaries and competitors alike.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, the three basic network topologies described in netwar 
are “chain,” “hub,” and “all-channel” models.8 Each network is comprised of a set of 
nodes that are linked together through a communication structure that transmits not only 
information, but shared ideas and values. This communication structure may leverage old 
and new technology or personal and familial relationships as transmission channels. 
Robust netwar actors are apt to be hybrids of each of these models with simple portions 
of the network consisting of chains while other more advanced elements may resemble 
hub or all-channel networks.9 The strength of the netwar actor is its ability to adapt to an 
ever changing environment while enhancing operational effectiveness and ensuring its 
survival.10 Hence, netwar actors by nature are evolutionary, with impressive abilities  
to simultaneously “blend” defensive and offensive actions. A key characteristic of the  
all-channel network type is the lack of a central hierarchy, which means that there is no 
true head and thus, the network is not only extremely difficult to destroy but able to 
conduct decentralized operations along with a capability to adapt to a rapidly changing 
environment.11 
                                                 
7 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 5. 
8 Ibid., 49. 
9 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, eds., “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 8.  
10 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, 47. 
11 Ibid., 9.  
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Figure 1.  The three basic types of network organizations include the chain, 
hub and all-channel models.12  
Describing the Caballeros Templarios cartel as a netwar actor requires a 
combination of several related lines of work. Its internal structure, workflow, and 
relationships are best presented using a hybridization of the models of Mintzberg and 
Evan.13 The two modeling techniques together allow the critical interconnectivity of the 
Templarios to be clearly explained.  
Showing the specific internal effects of the Templarios narrative is best done 
through Jay Galbraith’s star model.14 This framework simplifies group characteristics 
into the five key core elements of: strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people. As 
will be discussed in Chapters IV and V, this method clarifies the dynamic and often 
confusing nature of the drug trade by focusing on critical common elements.  
2. Net-Warlords 
Our term “net-warlord” is used in this study to describe a criminal group that 
adopts netwar practices and has evolved into an organization that resembles what Robert 
                                                 
12 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, 49. 
13 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 
399; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” 7–9. 
14 Amy Kates and Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 
Critical Design Challenges, (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2007), 3. 
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J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan describe as a “third generation cartel.”15 The evolutionary 
path described by Bunker and Sullivan sees cartels initially seeking to maximize profits 
through violent aggression, then gradually co-opting state institutions via corruption, and 
ultimately establishing themselves as a “parallel state.”16 This gradual process of change 
is organized into three phases, which cartels progress through as they expand their 
collective reach and gain power.17 Bunker and Sullivan present the third-phase cartel as 
fully developed netwarriors, who “… rule parallel polities, or criminal enclaves, acting 
much like warlords.”18  
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. This chapter introduced the topic, purpose, 
and key concepts discussed in the thesis. Chapter II reviews the history and background 
details pertinent to the Caballeros Templarios’ transformation from standard cartel to 
fully functional net-warlord. In Chapter III, we examine the Templarios narrative and 
information operations. In particular, we focus on the characteristics that enable this 
narrative and identity to motivate Templarios members towards a common cause, making 
them capable of surviving as a coherent entity even when under attack by powerful 
enemies. In Chapter IV, we apply several modeling methods to typical Mexican cartels, 
explaining their organizational elements. Chapter V contrasts Templarios organizational 
characteristics with those common to more traditional drug cartels, with particular focus 
on the effect of a narrative. The final chapter of this thesis analyzes the Templarios 
overall success as a net-warlord operation and will address implications for future 
counter-cartel strategies. 
 
                                                 
15 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution Revisited,” in Narcos over the Border: 
Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries, ed. Robert J. Bunker, 145–178 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 33. 
16 Ibid., 34. 
17 Ibid., 31. 
18 Ibid., 34. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE CABALLEROS TEMPLARIOS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The cartel known as the Caballeros Templarios can trace its lineage as far back as 
the mid-1980s. The roots of the Templarios stretch back to a period when vigilante 
groups in Michoacán began to oppose the movement of drugs through their state by 
outside criminal groups.19 For a short period, these local vigilante groups successfully 
opposed the influx of drugs into the area and the extortion of local citizens. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, over time these same groups eventually became involved in the drug trade 
themselves, facilitating the movement of drugs through the state and eventually 
expanding their operations to include numerous other criminal enterprises.20 This chapter 
focuses on the history of the modern drug trade within Michoacán and the conditions that 
led to the rise and fall of the Caballeros Templarios drug cartel. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO 
Mexico has long served as a conduit through which illegal goods are shipped 
from Central and South America (as well as from Mexico itself) into the United States. In 
the first half of the twentieth century, contraband, especially marijuana and heroin were 
smuggled utilizing a simple, effective system consisting of stealth and bribery to move 
small batches of product into the United States.21 At this point in the early 1960s, seizure 
of five pounds of marijuana was considered front page news.22 Today, seizure of drugs 
measured in tonnage barely rates a mention in the media.  
                                                 
19 Samuel Logan and John P. Sullivan, “Mexico’s Divine Justice,” International and Security 
Relations Network, August 17, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=104677  
20 George W. Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, 
Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State they Created (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2012), 93. 
21 Terrence E. Poppa, Drug Lord: A True Story. The Life and Death of a Mexican Kingpin (El Paso: 
Cinco Punto Press, 2010), 5. 
22 Ibid., 30. 
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Earlier generations of smugglers were content to augment their meager incomes 
as farmers and ranchers by moving these small amounts of legal and illicit products 
across the border. This nascent smuggling culture was heavily dependent on close 
familial relationships and driven more by a need to survive financially than the pursuit of 
a significant profit margin. The profits generated by the smugglers were small enough 
that the issue was of little concern to the federal governments on either side of the border. 
So long as drugs were not sold in Mexico, the matter of enforcement was left in the hands 
of the local governments, which more often than not turned a blind eye to the smuggling.  
By the end of the 1960s, internal political corruption within Mexico, a new 
appetite for drugs by American youth, and a long standing tradition of border smuggling 
created the perfect conditions for sophisticated drug trafficking organizations to arise. 
The smuggling of modest quantities of marijuana became an activity of the past. 
C. THE PRI AND INSTITUTIONALIZED SMUGGLING: 1964–1975 
The decades during and after the Vietnam War saw a dramatic change in how the 
drug trade operated on both sides of the border. On the American side, President Richard 
Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1973 to deal with what he 
considered “public enemy number one,” illegal narcotics.23 The explosion of usage 
among American youth following the societal upheaval of the 1960s created a 
burgeoning market with higher profit margins that inspired a new business model.24 In 
this new model, Mexican drug smuggling grew in size and became more organized. The 
necessity to traffic larger shipments increasingly required more sophisticated smuggling 
techniques, such as vehicles with false compartments and greater intelligence regarding 
border security. In addition, the movement of large quantities of drugs required active 
cooperation by the Mexican federal government, unlike in previous periods when 
                                                 
23 The White House, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1973), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title5/pdf/USCODE-2011-title5-app-
reorganiz-other-dup96.pdf  
24 Maria Celia Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 15. 
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shipments were small. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) soon stepped in 
to take a controlling interest in every aspect of the trade in Mexico.25  
Although full-time criminal groups were emerging to feed the demand, they were 
still in their infancy and not yet truly independent criminal organizations. As one 
informant related to noted Mexican journalist Anabel Hernandez, “In 1970, the term 
cartel did not exist. There were just cliques, which grew and transported marijuana and 
heroin across the border.”26 Politicians loyal to the PRI held control over the vital areas 
of production and trade (known as plazas) and ensured that the system was mutually 
beneficial for all parties involved. Americans got their drugs, the PRI received its 
kickbacks, and the smugglers made their profit. The spoils were modest, and everyone 
was happy. 
D. OPEN MARKETS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MEXICAN 
FEDERATION  
The 1980s and 1990s saw the U.S. appetite for drugs change yet again as cocaine 
from Colombia flooded the market.27 While the countries of South America provided the 
product, Mexican smugglers (still under the watchful eye and controlling arm of the PRI) 
accepted a role as middle men who facilitated distribution.28 However, younger and more 
aggressive Mexican drug runners gradually saw an opportunity to take on a more 
powerful position within the drug world. Rather than simply act as middlemen in the 
business, the new generation increasingly took on a more central role within the drug 
trade.29 Fleets of aircraft under the direction of creative people, like Amado Carillo 
                                                 
25 Anabel Hernández, Narcoland: The Mexican Drug Lords and Their Godfathers (New York: Verso, 
2013), 64. 
26 Ibid., 63. 
27 Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs, 30. 
28 June S. Biettel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of Violence 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 8. 
29 Poppa, Drug Lord, 177. 
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Fuentes, began to deliver hundreds of tons of cocaine and other drugs to the “Norte 
Americanos.”30  
Meanwhile, the PRI began to slowly lose its tight grip on power as cries for a 
more democratic political process started to rise. These changes in Mexican politics 
allowed drug trafficking organizations (DTO) to exert more and more influence over the 
illicit activities within the plazas they controlled. The eventual dismantling of the major 
Columbian cartels in the late 1980s and early 1990s and their Caribbean smuggling 
routes further strengthened the position of Mexican DTOs. Soon the Mexicans traffickers 
were a drug cartel unto themselves.31 
The successful growth of this first organization, known as the “Guadalajara 
Cartel,” was to be short-lived as the decision by its leader to enter semi-retirement (and 
his subsequent arrest) led to a division of his narco-kingdom among his top lieutenants.32 
For the next decade, the cartels he spawned, collectively known as the “Mexican 
Federation,” went about business as usual with only occasional bursts of violence 
directed almost exclusively at each other. Perhaps inevitably, competition amongst the 
cartel leaders, along with a changing political landscape in Mexico, resulted in increasing 
violence and an inability of the government to continue its unofficial regulation of the 
Mexican drug trade. In addition to the rise in violence, an earlier unofficial prohibition of 
selling drugs to Mexican citizens was slowly pushed aside resulting in a burgeoning 
market and rising addiction rates in Mexico.33 As Mexico entered the twenty-first century 
and amid growing anger at the corrupt PRI, two dominant cartels emerged as powerful 
rivals that would again change the face of the drug trade in Mexico.  
                                                 
30 Sylvia Longmire, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 50.  
31 Biettel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations, 8. 
32 Malcolm Beith, The Last Narco (New York, New York: Grove Press, 2010), 47. 
33 Laura Villagran, “As Mexico’s Traffickers Ship Drugs North, They Leave Addicts in Their Wake,” 




1. The Sinaloa Cartel 
In the northwestern region of Mexico, Joaquin “Chapo” Guzman, a man famous 
not only for violence but also for his business acumen, rose to a leadership position 
within the Sinaloa cartel.34 Thanks to Guzman’s creativity and willingness to use extreme 
violence when necessary, this cartel now controls the majority of the smuggling routes 
that pass into California, New Mexico, and Arizona, a border nearly 700 miles long.  
The Sinaloa cartel, in contrast to the newer cartels such as Los Zetas and the 
Caballeros Templarios, has retained a traditional or standard business model and remains 
primarily focused on transporting illegal narcotics as quietly and discreetly as possible.35 
The cartel is able to generate huge revenues by leveraging strategic locations that it 
controls (such as border crossing points) while guaranteeing its own security through the 
corruption of political leaders. According to Proceso Magazine, Chapo Guzman’s 
greatest contribution to the Mexican drug trade was in transforming the relationship 
between cartels and the government.36 In the past, the cartels were essentially working 
for the government; under Chapo Guzman, “. . . the public officials became employees of 
the drug traffickers, and their armed wing.”37  
2. The Gulf Cartel and the Rise of Los Zetas 
While the Sinaloa cartel was growing in size and power on the west coast of 
Mexico, el Cartel de Gulfo (CDG) aka the Gulf cartel, led by Oseil Cardenas Guillen, 
focused its efforts on securing the profitable plazas that linked northeast Mexico to 
southeast Texas. Under the leadership of Cardenas Guillen, the Gulf cartel made its mark 
by not only moving massive quantities of cocaine across the Texas border, but also by 
adopting brutal military-style tactics to support its operations.38 
                                                 
34 Hernández, Narcoland, 33. 
35 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 
208.  
36 Hernández, Narcoland, 195. 
37 Ibid., 195. 
38 George W. Grayson, The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations 
and Their Impact on U.S. Security, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014), 57. 
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As he grew in power, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, known as el Mata Amigos or “the 
friend killer,” became increasingly paranoid about his personal safety. His desire to 
protect his life at all cost led him to create an elite team of bodyguards recruited from 
former military and law enforcement personnel. The group was primarily composed of 
deserters from a Mexican Army Special Forces unit known as el Grupo Aeromóvil de 
Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE).39 Under Cardenas’ employment, they branded themselves 
Los Zetas in recognition of their former military radio call-sign. The responsibilities of 
Los Zetas quickly expanded beyond serving as mere bodyguards, as they increasingly 
carried out special missions for the cartel, such as kidnappings, extortion, and 
assassinations.40 In addition to their skillful application of violence, Los Zetas leveraged 
their unique understanding of unconventional warfare tactics to conduct psychological 
warfare in support of the cartels objectives.41 The effectiveness of these tactics was soon 
emulated by rival cartels. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the state of 
Michoacán.  
E. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MICHOACÁN 
Michoacán lies on the Pacific coast of Mexico within the south-central region of 
the country. It shares major borders with the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato to the north, 
and with the states of Guerrero and Mexico on its southern and southeastern borders 
respectively. A road network that crisscrosses its territory allows for the quick and easy 
movement of goods in all directions, especially from Central and South America. Most 
importantly, Michoacán possesses several sea ports, including the deep water port of 
Lazaro Cardenas. This strategically important port facilitates both the export and import 
of a variety of goods essential to the drug trade. Perhaps most valuable to the drug trade, 
chemical precursors necessary for the production of methamphetamine flow into the port 
while the finished product exits the port for consumption in North America and Asia.42 
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Seeking to control this port and the valuable production area and to secure local 
interest in Michoacán from rival outside groups, a group of traffickers, known as the 
Tierra Caliente, established a loose-knit vigilante organization in the mid-1980s.43 The 
central leadership of this confederation of drug trafficking families included Carlos 
Rosales Mendoza at the top and would eventually include José de Jesús Méndez Vargas 
and Nazario Moreno González. By the late 1990s, the confederation had officially joined 
with the Millenio cartel (a regional cartel with allegiance to the Gulf cartel) to coordinate 
drug trafficking and production efforts in the state. This alliance continued until early 
2002 when the senior members of the confederation, nicknamed the “12 Apostles,” 
sought to replace the Millenio cartel in Michoacán and take sole control of all illegal 
activity in the state.44 In order to do so, the 12 Apostles declared a formal alliance with 
the Gulf cartel (CDG) and emerged as La Empresa, “The Enterprise.”45  
1. La Empresa and Los Zetas 
The Millenio cartel enjoyed significant power in Michoacán, and the leaders of La 
Empresa recognized that the assistance of an outside power would be required if La 
Empresa was to seize control of the plazas in the state.46 Luckily for the leadership of La 
Empresa, the Gulf cartel had recently created a paramilitary organization that was 
equipped and trained to conduct special operations missions. It was at this point that the 
members of La Empresa were introduced to the brutal tactics of Los Zetas.47 Los Zetas’ 
membership consisted of former soldiers with special operations experience and its 
tactics in unconventional warfare proved extremely effective in battling the Millenio 
cartel. La Empresa quickly adopted the same tactics including the use of psychological 
operations to instill fear in its enemies and discipline within its ranks. By early 2003, La 
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Empresa and Los Zetas controlled the drug trade in the entire state, establishing a 
monopoly to be enjoyed by the Gulf Cartel.  
2. La Familia Michoacán Emerges 
This successful alliance proved short lived as it soon became clear that Los Zetas 
were becoming a threat to both its masters in the Gulf Cartel and to its former allies, La 
Empresa. This growing distrust, coupled with the arrest of senior Gulf cartel leader Osiel 
Cardenas Guillen in 2003, eventually escalated into full-blown war in Michoacán. 
Stability was further eroded when José de Jesús “el Chango” Méndez Vargas and Nazario 
“el Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez began to influence the direction of the cartel after 
Carlos Rosales Mendoza’s arrest in 2004. The result was that by the end of 2005, La 
Empresa had morphed into a new organization known as La Familia Michoacán (LFM).
48
 
In September of 2006, LFM announced its arrival by throwing five severed heads 
on to a crowded dance floor in the city of Uruapan, Michoacán.49 In contrast to the 
traditional “smuggler cowboy” image of the Sinaloans or the quasi-military persona of 
the Zetas, the leaders of La Familia decided to adopt a new identity. No longer 
characterizing itself as just another criminal union focusing on drug production and 
distribution, Moreno Gonzalez presented the cartel as a “messianic organization” intent 
on delivering “divine justice” (along with drugs).50 In a manner similar to the founder of 
a cult, El Mas Loco developed a detailed ideology and drafted a specific doctrine to 
control his followers.  
Adopting the writings of the conservative Christian evangelical author John 
Eldredge as a spiritual guide, Moreno Gonzalez created a declaration of identity called 
the “The Principles of the Family.”51 This document described in detail what La Familia 
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was, what it represented, and its objectives.
52
 Incorporating Eldredge’s ideas concerning 
masculinity, it centered on releasing the internal warrior and creating a purpose for 
members of the cartel.53 The “sole motive” of the group, the catechism states, is to 
protect the state and people that they love, while ensuring that universal values are 
adhered to.
54
 The document concludes with an appeal to the patriotism and honor of the 
men of Michoacán to support and join the group in order to “fight the maladies that afflict 
the state.”55 
a. La Familia as a Social Movement 
At its height, La Familia is believed to have had close to 9000 members who, in 
addition to conducting normal drug trafficking operations, also sought to build and 
maintain public support.56 They did this by conducting numerous social outreach projects 
that in the past might have been carried out by the Catholic Church and other charitable 
organizations. They “financed dozens of schools; supported churches and drug rehab 
centers; provided gifts to the poor and . . . offered consumer loans.”57 In addition to social 
outreach, the cartel took a page from the Chapo Guzman’s playbook and invested heavily 
in various political campaigns.58 The politicians, once elected, ensured that the cartel 
could operate freely and brazenly within the state.  
La Familia Michoacán, like La Empresa before it, was led by a small group of 
men who served as the strategic and operational directors of the organization. At the 
strategic apex were el Chango and el Mas Loco while newcomers like Servando “La 
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Tuta” Gómez Martínez, Enrique “El Kike” Plancarte Solís, and Dionicio ““El Tio” Loya 
Plancarte headed up activities such as production, trafficking, extortion, recruitment, and 
public relations.59 The leadership of LFM focused most of its recruitment efforts on the 
young and disenfranchised youth of Michoacán; “They emphasize(d) rehabilitation, 
empowerment, and self-renewal to drug addicts, alcoholics, juvenile delinquents, and 
others who [felt] alone and isolated.”60 Hypocritically, while preaching the great evils of 
drug use, the cartel produced thousands of pounds of methamphetamine in its laboratories 
for overseas shipment.61 
F. RISE OF THE CABALLEROS TEMPLARIOS 
At the end of 2010, La Familia began to splinter just as the Gulf cartel had in the 
previous decade. Nazario Moreno, the enigmatic spiritual leader of the cartel, was 
allegedly killed in a shootout with government forces in December 2010 and soon after 
various factions within La Familia sought to inherit the kingdom of “El Mas Loco.”62 
Three months into 2011, a new criminal group callings itself the Caballeros Templarios 
or “Knights Templar” announced its existence by unfurling banners and posters 
throughout Michoacán.  
To the People of Michoacán: We inform you, that as of today, we will be 
performing the duties previously realized by la Familia Michoacán. We 
will be at the service of the people of Michoacán to handle any situation 
that undermines their integrity. Our commitment to society is to preserve 
order, prevent thefts, kidnappings, extortions, and protect the State from 
possible interventions by rival organizations.63  
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By June of 2011, “El Chango” Mendez had been arrested, and this mysterious 
new group had absorbed the majority of the La Familia members remaining in 
Michoacán.64 Like La Familia before it, the Templarios crafted a powerful message and 
identity that resonated with the people of Michoacán. In fact, the Templarios not only 
succeeded in acquiring its predecessor’s profitable drug trade, but also usurped La 
Familia’s spiritual tenets, further refining them into a fully developed code of conduct 
and ideology.65 
Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, although rumored killed by the federal government, 
remained very much alive and continued to oversee the spiritual direction of the 
organization while sharing in the leadership of the group from the shadows.66 Servando 
“La Tuta” Gómez Martínez, a former teacher, emerged as the de-facto leader and 
charismatic spokesman for the bizarre group, which not only claimed the “social justice” 
duties of La Familia but also the mantle and emblems of the medieval knights from the 
twelfth and thirteenth century.67 
1. Establishment of a Shadow State 
Like its predecessor, La Familia, the Templarios sought to mask its criminal 
activities behind a veneer of social work and religious piety. However, unfortunately for 
their criminal rivals, federal security forces, and the citizens of Michoacán, the 
Templarios also proved itself just as brutal as La Familia. One of the first acts of violence 
the members of Templars committed in 2011 was to hang a man whom they had found 
guilty of kidnapping.68
 
The cartel was initially welcomed by a people eager for swift 
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justice; this was an open challenge to the state’s monopoly on violence. The people’s 
already low confidence in established government institutions was eroded further by 
these and similar acts. Soon, everything from minor land disputes to domestic violence 
incidents were brought to the cartel for resolution.69 The extent of the subversion of the 
criminal justice system became evident in the summer of 2014 when over 100 municipal 
police officers and other law enforcement officials were arrested for working for the 
cartel.70 
The dispensation of justice was not the only way in which civil society was 
undermined; the Templarios (like the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas) also expanded its 
operations into areas not traditionally associated with drug trafficking.71 As their political 
clout and influence increased within Michoacán the Templars increasingly expanded the 
scope of their operations to include extortion, illegal mining and logging, kidnapping, as 
well as numerous legitimate business ventures.72  
2. Life under the Templarios  
La Familia and the Caballeros Templarios ruled Michoacán (as well as portions of 
the surrounding states) without a significant challenge for the better part of six years 
(2007-2013).73 Capitalizing on popular support and pre-existing political connections 
established by La Familia, the Templarios further solidified its control of the state 
following the elections of 2012. By its own admission, the Templarios financed the 
political campaigns of numerous Michoacán politicians, including the eventual governor 
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of the state, Fausto Vallejo Figueroa.74 Vallejo was elected to the governorship of 
Michoacán as a member of the PRI and the Templarios brazenly directed that he and 
other politicians make good on prior agreements to support the cartel.75  
Although the group had already enjoyed significant popular support under the 
banner of La Familia, the Templarios invested substantially more effort into advancing its 
pseudo-religious ideology. Statues and shrines devoted to the memory of Nazario Moreno 
Gonzalez established him as a new “narco-saint.”76 The purpose of this was to not only to 
attract new recruits, but “to penetrate the social and popular consciousness.”77 Efforts 
such as these appeared to work to some extent as popular support for the cartel increased. 
News reports during this period featured locals defending the cartels work. “Since the 
caballeros took over here, things have got much better,” a young female resident says. “I 
would rather this than what we had before.”78  
The reign of the Templarios, while beneficial to its members and those who 
collaborated with them, had an overall negative impact on the average citizen. Despite 
statements to the contrary, kidnapping and extortion were becoming rampant under the 
Templars.79 Furthermore, the number of violent crimes in the state rose dramatically.80 In 
addition, the cartel’s brand of justice continued to be carried out in progressively 
gruesome ways. In one instance, the cartel crucified an alleged rapist, placing the body 
                                                 
74 “Caballeros Templarios Reveal Agreement with PRI Party,” Borderland Beat, December 2, 2012, 
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/12/caballeros-templarios-reveal-agreement.html 
75 Ibid. 
76 Falko A. Ernst, “Seeking a Place in History—Nazario Moreno’s Narco Messiah,” Insightcrime, 
March 12, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/seeking-a-place-in-history-narazio-moreno-
narco-messiah  
77 Michael Lohmuller, “Rumors Fuel Legend of Narco-Saint,” Insightcrime, February 6, 2014, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/rumors-fuel-legend-of-narco-saint 
78 Tuckman, “Mexico Drug War Continues to Rage.” 
79 Chivis Martinez, “Tuta Speaks, Emphasizes Z40 Must Be Killed,” Borderland Beat, August 22, 
2012, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/08/new-video-tuta-speaks.html 
80 Ministry of the Interior“Cifras de Incidencia Delectiva 1997–2014 [Crime Rate Statistics 1997–
2014],” June 18, 2014, http://www.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/es/SecretariadoEjecutivo/09082013. 
 20 
along a busy highway.81 By the start of 2013, the Caballeros Templarios effectively 
controlled the state of Michoacán through a concentrated campaign of coercion and fear. 
G. FALL OF THE CABALLEROS TEMPLARIOS 
As the Templarios consolidated power in Michoacán and the surrounding region 
they encountered limited institutional opposition to their rule. Having successfully 
undermined law enforcement throughout the state, the people were left with no one to 
bring their grievances to except the cartel.82 It was in this environment that the 
beginnings of a counter movement took shape. 
1. Emergence of a Counter Movement  
In May 2011, the small Indian village of Cheran in northern Michoacán 
successfully resisted efforts by the cartel to harvest timber illegally and extort the 
populace.83 Over the next year, similar occurrences took place in other Indian villages 
with few inside or outside the state taking notice. Nothing indicated that these events 
were anything other than isolated incidents occurring in a few remote Indian villages. 
Sporadic cases of vigilantism had occurred throughout Mexico since the start of the 
current drug war, yet none had proven effective or inspired long-term movements.84  
The first large-scale challenge to the Caballeros Templarios’ dominance in the 
region occurred not in Michoacán but in the neighboring state of Guerrero. Located on 
the southern border of Michoacán, much of Guerrero was controlled by the Templarios. 
Like many of the southern states in Mexico with a large indigenous population, it had a 
long tradition of organizing volunteer police forces when necessary. Tolerated by the 
federal government, these “Policía Comunitaria” (community police) exercised limited 
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jurisdiction and were less susceptible to external corruption.85 Just as significantly, they 
enjoyed the full support of the localities they served, unlike their official government 
counterparts.86  
When the Caballeros Templarios began to target the indigenous communities 
within Guerrero in 2012, the native people of the state fought back.87 Former supporters 
of the cartel quickly changed their perception after kidnapping and extortion rates 
climbed, despite Templarios rhetoric to the contrary.88 Unlike the earlier resistance in 
Cheran, the movement in Guerrero gained momentum with poorly armed groups 
organizing in numerous towns and villages.89 
The year 2013 marked a turning point as it became clear that the vigilante 
movement in Guerrero was no longer restricted to indigenous towns and villages.90
 
The 
comunitarios now numbered in the hundreds and were increasing in size and experience 
daily. As the comunitarios achieved greater and greater success, wealthy farmers and 
ranchers in Michoacán began to take notice of the events in their home state and 
Guerrero.91 Rallying around a common desire to retake their communities and restore 
order, these initial “autodefensas” (self-defense groups) quickly went on the offensive.  
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Better armed, well organized, and funded with money from local businessmen, 
the Michoacán vigilantes enjoyed significant public support.92 By May of 2013, the 
movement had grown to include numerous municipalities within Michoacán.93 
According to Grillo, “They gradually spread to neighboring towns and villages, 
establishing cells of vigilantes in each territory they entered.”94 Most notably, these 
groups developed a tactic in which hundreds of individual vigilantes would swarm a 
cartel controlled town, quickly overwhelming their opponents.95 In this way, the counter-
movement adopted many of the same insurgent-like tactics the Templars used to seize 
control of the state. 
The federal government in Mexico City initially condemned the actions of the 
vigilantes as illegal.96 By November of 2013, however, the federal government realized 
the vigilantes had achieved considerable success in weakening the Templarios’ grip on 
Michoacán. Seizing the opportunity to defeat one of the most dangerous threats to federal 
and state sovereignty, President Pena-Nieto deployed military troops once again to 
Michoacán and seized the Lazaro Cardenas port.97   
At the end of 2013, the leaders of the vigilante movement in Michoacán formed a 
loose confederation and began to articulate their collective grievances to the 
government.98 Popular support for the vigilantes was at a high point, and the federal 
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government was forced to give limited recognition to the movement.99 Although not 
officially sanctioned, the military made it known that the vigilantes would not be forcibly 
disbanded.  
2. Vigilantes and the Government  
The year 2014 marked the beginning of the end for the Caballeros Templarios. 
The January arrest of Dionisio Loya Plancarte, one of the most senior members of the 
cartel, further disrupted the group’s operations.100 Working together, government 
security forces and vigilantes gradually defeated the Templarios in the largest 
municipalities. By the end of March, members of the Templarios inner council, including 
Enrique Plancarte Solís and Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, were dead. Soon, the only senior 
member still at large was Servando Gómez Martínez “La Tuta,” the group’s public 
spokesman.101 Seeing little more need for the vigilantes, the government began to exert 
its authority and slowly dismantled the vigilantes. At first, the government proposed to 
incorporate the vigilantes into a newly formed rural defense force, but then reversed 
direction and began arresting the most prominent leaders of the vigilante movement.102  
3. Aftermath 
While united in their hatred of the Templarios, the vigilantes and federal forces 
have a strained relationship. At this writing, La Tuta remains free and has allegedly 
formed a new criminal organization known as the Third Brotherhood (La Tercera 
Hermanadad (H3)).103 This new group is thought to be composed of former members of 
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the Caballeros Templarios, vigilantes, and assorted other criminal gangs.104 The 
leadership of the vigilantes is fractured with several key individual having being arrested 
by the federal authorities, while others having accepted offers to be coopted into official 
rural defense forces. Despite their conflicts, however, these groups have completely 
displaced the Templarios as the single, de-facto authority in the region. 
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III. THE NARRATIVE OF THE CABALLEROS TEMPLARIOS  
Information operations allow cartels to gain an operational advantage by shaping 
the information environment in a manner that not only ensures survival but also expands 
their reach to every facet of Mexican life. Cartel influence is rooted in long-established 
images of benign bandits who rob from the rich and give a bit back to the poor. Today, 
this image lives on and it is enhanced by cartel propaganda and by the growing popularity 
of an entire genre of entertainment dedicated to cartel exploits. Combining this with a 
capability to demonstrate serious threats to their rivals and fulfill the material desires of 
supporters, Mexican cartels have a significant ability to influence behavior to their direct 
benefit.  
Since its emergence in 2011, the Caballeros Templarios embraced propaganda 
and information operations as critical features of its operations to a degree well beyond 
that of its peers. Crafting a powerful narrative tailored to preconceived audience 
sensitivities, it was able to maintain a cohesive, flat, and highly resilient organization. 
This chapter will define the details of Caballeros Templarios’ unique narrative. In 
particular, it will present the origin and content of the cartel’s messages, and the broad 
strategic role they played in the Templarios evolution to a net-warlord within Michoacán.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the terms “narrative” and “information operations” used will be 
used in the same manner in which the U.S. military employs them. Narrative is a story 
that provides a coherent framework for a group’s actions. It explains “what has happened, 
what is happening, and why it has happened.”105 Information operations are those 
techniques that allow an actor to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making 
of an adversary.106 In short, narrative is a tool that enables a group to define its identity 
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and objectives; information operations are those activities that focus on supporting the 
overall narrative.107  
B. CARTEL INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
The ongoing Mexican drug war has seen not only unprecedented violence, but the 
employment and increasing importance of sophisticated information operations to shape 
the environment.108 The conflict has evolved from one in which power and influence is 
measured solely by the ability to physically control plazas to one in which perceptions in 
the information environment are vital to victory. This fight for information dominance 
can be as fierce and technologically complex as the physical fight for territorial control. 
Likewise, the control of information has become just as important as production and 
delivery of product. 109  
Transnational criminal organizations, such as the Mexican cartels, are well suited 
to execute information operations. As entities that rely on multiple networks (social, 
familial, political and business) to achieve strategic and operational objectives, they have 
access to numerous conduits through which they can deliver messages and propagate 
perceptions. Cartels in general maintain robust information operations to support several 
goals. First, they seek to gain support of the populace through social outreach and public 
appeals. Second, they seek to gain new recruits and intimidate rivals through acts of 
violence and demonstrations of power. Finally, they seek to sustain and strengthen the 
bonds between cartel members. These goals will be discussed in more detail below. 
1. Support 
Mexican cartels deliberately target audiences with images, messages, and 
activities that gain them freedom of action, as well as generate both passive and active 
support from the populace. These activities promote a two-faced, persona of the 
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respectable outlaw. As Terrence Poppa points out in his seminal work, Drug Lord, 
alongside acts of torture and murder, there is a tradition of bestowing gifts upon the poor 
going back to the earliest days of the drug trade.110 According to this image, cartels 
adhere to a criminal code of honor: on one hand they support the unfortunate and 
downtrodden; on the other they do not hesitate to commit horrific acts of violence against 
their enemies.  
The unique and pervasive Mexican cultural phenomenon known as “narcocultura” 
(drug culture) supports this image. This distinct set of popular media (cinema, music, 
literature, television) is in many cases directly funded and promoted by the cartels.
111
 
Credited with enabling modern cartel influence, narcocultura has existed as a powerful 
part of Mexican national identity for decades.
112
 In fact, with the increased visibility of 
the cartels and subsequent sensationalized media attention, narcocultura has flourished, 
gaining widespread popularity in both Mexico and the United States.113  
At its most extreme, narcocultura even promotes certain pseudo-religious 
practices. These include the veneration of Jesus Malverde
114—a Robin Hood figure who 
protects outlaws and dangerous professions—and Santa Muerte (Saint Death)115 — a 
grim reaper-like entity, who cares for the poor and downtrodden. Both of these religious 
concepts provide psychological and spiritual buffers for criminals and societies alike 
against the negative effects of committing or accommodating acts of violence. They also 
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2. Recruitment and Intimidation 
Cartels also use information operations to recruit new members for their lower 
ranks, usually by appealing to basic desires for power and financial gain. This approach 
has a particular resonance with the large pool of impoverished and poorly educated youth 
in Mexico. Life in a cartel provides opportunities for material gain, respect, and power 
(through violence and fear). For potential recruits, this is an almost irresistible chance at 
rescue from lives of drudgery and frustration.117  
3. Internal Cohesion 
Cartels actively seek to maintain and strengthen the links between the individuals 
and nodes of the organization. Appealing to a loyalty and self-preservation, they seek to 
tie members together in a way that resists the biggest threat to long-term group cohesion. 
This threat is the inherently self-interested and divisive influence of the larger 
narcocultura that supports cartel activity as a whole.118 Leveraging narrative as described 
by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Mexican cartels frequently use familial, geographic, or elitist 
themes to “…help keep people connected in a network whose looseness makes it difficult 
to prevent defection.”119  
C. TEMPLARIOS NARRATIVE 
Militant Christian ideology was the core of the Caballeros Templarios narrative. 
Unlike branding efforts by other cartels (such as the Zetas), Templarios information 
operations did more than just instill fear or tactical discipline. The Templarios used 
complex, long-term, mutually-reinforcing, and wide-ranging means of communications 
to propagate a message focused on recruitment, bolstering popular support (active or 
passive), and justifying violence. Appealing to religious righteousness, they attracted 
hundreds of active recruits and public supporters, and maintained robust state-wide 
informal connections, as well as organizational cohesion. It also allowed members to 
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rationalize violence and terror tactics against their victims. In line with the use of 
ideology in netwar, it used its group narrative, “…to confound people’s fundamental 
beliefs about the nature of their culture, society, and government, partly to foment fear 
but perhaps mainly to disorient people and unhinge their perceptions,”120 effectively 
reinforcing its image as the “shadow government” of the state of Michoacán.  
Likewise, although not the first cartel to realize the importance of influence 
activities, the Templarios quickly became noted master practitioners.121 The adoption of 
a powerful narrative, as well as sophisticated and extensive information operations made 
the Caballeros Templarios one of the most feared organizations in Mexico. In each of its 
incarnations, it was repeatedly named as the most dangerous cartel in the country.122
,
  
1. Identity and Mission 
The Templarios had a perception of themselves and their role in the world derived 
from a combination of mythologized histories of militant Catholic orders and modern 
evangelical ideas of personal mission.123 In their propaganda, instead of a criminal union, 
they were “missionary warriors,” or holy defenders of the state of Michoacán, focused on 
delivering “divine justice” to the enemies of the people.124 Indeed, the code of conduct of 
Los Caballeros Templarios explicitly states, “This struggle is for your people, my people, 
for ourselves and for our future generations.”125  
The Templarios founders developed the doctrine’s basis while the cartel was still 
known as La Familia Michoacán. La Familia’s declaration of identity (a precursor to the 
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Templar’s Code of Conduct), “The Principles of the Family,”126 was influenced heavily 
by the Christian evangelical author John Eldredge. This document was a detailed 
description of objectives and what the group represented.
127
 The “sole motive” of the 
group, the catechism states, is to protect the state and people that they love, while 
ensuring that universal values are adhered to.
128
 The document concludes with an appeal 
to the patriotism and honor of the men of Michoacán to support and join the group in 
order to “fight the maladies that afflict the state.”129  
The Templarios self-image as modern day crusaders against a corrupt 
government, vice, and rival cartel violence is further delineated in the “Codijo De Los 
Caballeros Templarios” (Code of the Knights Templar).130 This code is widely 
disseminated among the Michoacán population and specifically describes cartel members 
as holy warriors, outlining their duties to the organization and each other.131 This 
doctrine is further reinforced by images of an order of knights and is spread throughout 
Michoacán via every means possible: graffiti, social media, call in radio shows, full page 
newspaper advertisements. The group went so far as to conduct ceremonies with 
emblems of medieval knights from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These ceremonies 
included including armor, swords, and white cloaks emblazoned with crimson crosses, 
evoking a connection to the historic Knights Templar.132 
The group was also able to capitalize on a messianic theme stemming from the 
story of the miraculous survival of the La Familia / Templarios founding father and 
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spiritual guru, Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, from assassination. This story was enhanced by 
deliberate resurrection rumors by the overt leaders of the group.133  
D. THE IDEOLOGICAL EFFECT ON TEMPLARIOS OPERATIONS 
One of the key characteristics of any ideology, or strong group identity for that 
matter, is the ability to provide members a clear definition of the world.134 A strong and 
appealing narrative offers answers to life’s uncertainties, replacing confusion with 
confidence, and anxiety with clarity of purpose.135 Newly acquired certainty also 
frequently inspires belief in the inherent wrongness of anyone not accepting the same 
ideas.136 In worst case scenarios, anyone who does not agree is viewed as fundamentally 
“evil,” categorized as a faceless entity, and undeserving of sympathy.137 Unbelievers, 
societies, and institutions become valid targets for domination by those considering 
themselves truly deserving.138  
Because of its ideology, the Templarios were far more willing to commit violence 
against individuals not normally considered appropriate cartel targets.139 In this case, 
members of the Caballeros Templarios, with their self-appointed mission to protect and 
guide the people of Michoacán, provided an ideology that allowed members to inflict 
violence and dominate sinners, rivals, and any one they saw fit without remorse.  
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Besides having a sense of higher purpose, individual Templarios were equally 
influenced by the hyper-violent and self-promotional narcocultura. In the end, the 
Templarios were a cartel full of members motivated as much by desires for wealth and 
infamy as a sense of righteous entitlement. The Templarios narrative layered on top of 
pervasive, aggressive narcocultura created the perfect combination for self-interested, 
ambitious warlords.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The Templarios’ strategic narrative, manifested in their ideology, was a key 
component in their ability to execute operations. Through a detailed doctrine and a 
sophisticated recruitment and indoctrination process, it standardized group norms to 
maintain discipline and gain passive and active support from the populace in its areas of 
operation.140 Leveraging a variety of tactics and strategies, including extensive 
propaganda and public relations, it de-sensitized the people of Michoacán to the cartel’s 
illicit activities, ensuring certain behaviors and attitudes that enhanced the cartel’s ability 
to dominate the region. The polished Templarios narrative enabled it to sustain and 
expand their operations even in the face of aggressive Mexican and United States 
government counter-narcotic actions.  
At their inception as a comparatively small and regionally limited gang, 
Templarios founders faced the daunting prospect of facing larger, better-armed, and 
better-established rival cartels. Perhaps initially intended as a survival tactic, the 
Templarios narrative had an enormous effect on the group’s overall end goal, changing it 
from local underworld dominance to total regional control—from a criminal kingpin to a 
warlord. 
  
                                                 




IV. CARTEL ORGANIZATION 
This chapter describes the organizational design methods used to analyze the 
Caballeros Templarios. This provides basic background knowledge of the selected 
analysis methods. In addition, to provide context for comparison, the methods are applied 
to typical Mexican drug cartel structure. This serves to highlight the differences imparted 
by the Templarios use of narrative examined in Chapter III.  
Accurately describing the organizational makeup and operations of cartels 
requires the use of several complementary organizational design concepts. First and most 
fundamental of these is Jay Galbraith’s star model framework. Using this method as the 
foundation of analysis allows the basic cartel elements to be discussed individually. This 
simplifies understanding of the groups’ overall behavior. The second design concept is 
Henry Mintzberg’s organizational model. This addresses details of cartel structure and 
describes the basic functionality of cartels at a macro level. Specifically, Mintzberg’s 
model highlights the purpose for their particular internal connective methods. Finally, to 
emphasize both the strength and vulnerabilities of cartel structure, William Evans 
network models is used.141 This method is applied as interpreted in the netwar work of 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, allowing clear visualization of how cartels organize to react to 
their environment. It will also set the basis for addressing the organizational differences 
of the Templarios.  
A. ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Mexican drug cartels in general operate in an environment that is dynamic, 
dangerous, but conceptually simple.142 It is “simple” because of the limited number 
products and core activities involved (e.g., narcotics, extortion) and the relatively few key 
individuals truly involved in managing activity. Ultimately, the cartels’ primary goal is 
the generation of profit as quickly and efficiently as possible.143 Accordingly, they 
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largely limit themselves to areas that generate the most return with the least amount of 
investment.144 Uncomplicated strategies, simple structures, straightforward processes, 
low-skilled personnel, and rewards targeting basic human desires are the foundations of 
the Mexican criminal cartels.145 
As simplistic as basic operating principles in this environment may be, 
competition for the incredible potential profit in this environment is intense and often 
deadly. Cartels must defend themselves from brutal attacks by fellow criminals and 
strong pressures by both Mexican and U.S. authorities to limit their activities. They must 
also constantly guard against internal dissent.146 Because of this, cartels have evolved 
methods of organization that allow them to quickly respond to threats and environmental 
changes, while maintaining tight control on the direction and activities of subordinates. 
B. CARTEL ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS 
Cartels, despite their myriad connections to people and institutions at every level 
of Mexican society, are by themselves defined by only a few critical components. These 
components are best depicted and defined by Jay Galbraith’s star model framework, 
depicted in Figure 2, and they are: strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people.147 
It is these core elements that determine how cartels structure themselves, and ultimately 
how they choose to pursue their profits.  
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Figure 2.  Galbraith star model showing the core elements of  
Mexican cartels148  
1. Strategy 
The ultimate cartel end goal is profit.149 With this in mind, overall strategy takes 
the form of the straightforward application of money or intimidation. Cartels seek to 
extract as much profit as possible from high-return enterprises, with as little investment in 
time or resources as possible. By and large, they can be content to be left alone to pursue 
this profit and do not move very far outside of their illicit areas of interest. Even brutality 
and blatant bribery is intended to prevent interference in their activities. Despite this 
desire for basic freedom from interference, the sheer scale of profit in contention requires 
cartels to be willing take strong measures to deter rivals and attackers. As a result, cartel 
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strategy is best summed up by the traditional offer of “plata o plomo” (silver or lead); the 
choice between extreme violence and irresistible coercion.  
2. Structure 
In their highly dangerous environment, cartels must resist attacks by fellow 
criminals as well as strong pressure from both Mexican and U.S. authorities aimed at 
limiting their activities. They must also constantly guard against internal dissent driven 
by individual desires for the very profits they organize to pursue.150 Because of this, 
cartels have evolved methods of organization that allow them to quickly respond to 
threats and a variety of environmental changes, while maintaining tight control on the 
direction and activities of subordinates.151  
a. Mintzberg Formal Structure 
The method of modeling developed by Henry Mintzberg provides the clearest 
visualization of the formal superior-subordinate and intra-cellular connections of the 
cartels. At a macro level, Mexican cartels in general have evolved into what Mintzberg 
describes as a personalized-divisional form.152 This form is a hybrid of two primary 
forms, the simple and the divisional, and imparts the strengths and weaknesses of each.  
As defined by Mintzberg, a simple organization is one in which the key element is 
the strategic head.153 For cartels, this is a group’s overall boss, who personally manages 
the activities of subordinate cells (plazas). A boss does this either directly or through a 
select few trusted lieutenants.154 A divisional structure is one in which each subordinate 
cell, or division in an overarching organization operates independent of any other, and 
outputs are standardized. In typical cartels, this means that individual plazas are solely 
responsible for any cartel business in their defined territory. Inter-plaza support is 
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generally limited to receiving or handing-off products to the next plaza in a larger chain 
of transport.  
As depicted in Figure 3, the personalized-division basic combines simple and 
divisional characteristics.155 In this hybrid structure, a series of compartmentalized, 
centralized, leadership-dependent sub-elements are managed by another centralized, 
leadership-dependent organization.156 This results in an overarching structure that, while 
vulnerable to the targeting of key leaders and limited in the capacity and effective span of 
control, is also very tightly controlled, flexible, resilient,157 and well-suited to criminal 
operations.158  
 
Figure 3.  Henry Mintzberg’s method personalized-divisional structure, 
showing internal cartel formal connections  
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a. Evan Interconnectivity 
William Evan’s modeling methods, as adapted by Arquilla and Ronfeldt,159 
enable Mintzberg-style models to be interpreted in a manner that shows both cartel 
strengths and limitations. As illustrated in Figure 4, the previously described 
personalized-divisional form, when arranged according to Evan’s methods, can be 
depicted as a hub or star network.160 The cartel boss (strategic head) forms the center of 
the array, and each of the subordinate plazas (divisions) radiates outward, independent of 
one another.  
The hub form is highly resilient and capable of reacting very quickly to threats. 
The compartmentalized nature of the overall organizations makes cartels very difficult to 
completely defeat. A central leader is removed from likely contact with hostile forces 
behind layers of subordinates, making them difficult to locate and affect. In addition, 
centralized communication limits the individual knowledge of the periphery, ensuring an 
attacker cannot seriously damage the entire organization by damaging one single spoke.  
This form also limits the potential reach of cartels, restricting them to certain 
areas of interest. This is due to an inherent limitation on the span of personal control of 
the central leadership. With the danger of internal dissent, a cartel traditionally retains as 
much power in the hands of as few key individuals as possible. Cartel leadership must 
have as much input into a subordinates activities as possible. This restricts the diversity 
and complexity of the cartels interests for the most part. As a result, cartels remain 
focused on a few core processes.  
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Figure 4.  Mintzberg simple structure161 represented as an Evan hub 
network,
162
 showing both intra-cartel management and inter-plaza 
relationships 
3. Processes 
Mexican cartels rely on only a few core operational processes to extract profit and 
promote influence. These are: extortion, corruption, and propaganda (especially 
narcocultura).163 Limiting themselves to these few area of interest allows Mexican cartels 
to operate without seriously interfering with day-to-day Mexican life.164 Even the most 
direct means of communication is done in a way to keep cartels from becoming a focus of 
popular concern to the point that they are unable to pursue their profits. 
Extortion although common, usually takes the form of demanding payment in 
exchange for not damaging people or property.165 A large percentage of Mexican 
business and industry pays to keep cartels from harming individuals or operations, but it 
rarely exceeds what they can effectively afford. Like extortion, corruption by the cartels 
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is widespread in Mexico.166 However, like the use of violence, corruption primarily 
ensures protection from law enforcement and maintains a cartel’s ability to operate 
unhindered.167 Propaganda, most often in the form of narcocultura (clothes, songs, 
movies, and other media), does serve to build the attraction for cartel activities, but it is 
not normally to inspire active support or fear. Instead, it primarily functions as a way of 
psychologically buffering both cartel members and society.168  
4. People 
Cartels recruit from the large Mexican population of deprived and desperate 
individuals with limited skills.169 Although, specialists and experts in particular areas do 
exist, they are not generally solidly aligned members of any one particular group.170 This 
being the case, as a result of their impoverished, lower-class backgrounds the majority of 
true cartel members possess limited opportunities for alternative means of economic 
advancement.  
Cartel work offers a chance at upward social mobility in return for a willingness 
to commit crime.171 This offer appeals to prospective members who are willing to do 
whatever is required to attain the rewards offered.172 As a result, cartel ranks are filled 
with individuals pre-disposed to violent and self-interested behavior. These recruits can 
easily become a threat to fellow members. In this situation, cartel personnel are 
simultaneously motivated to work with organizations for immense material gain, but are 
also highly likely to turn on those same organizations if there is a chance at greater 
reward for doing so. This makes managing and rewarding these personnel a central 
concern. 
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5. Rewards 
Similar to the structural element, rewards seek to ensure strict loyalty and 
obedience but limit overall cartel control.173 Cartel rewards are of two general types, 
positive and negative, which can contradict each other. Positive incentives can inspire 
greed and dissent, while negative incentives can breed resentment and revenge. 
Traditional cartels positively motivate members and supporters via the prospect of 
material gain, reputation, and power.174 They offer more opportunities for personal gain 
than other cartels in return for good work and loyalty. Negative motivation takes the form 
of serious threats to life and limb, with punishment meted out in brutal ways.175  
This dichotomy of temptation and threat serves as a powerful incentive to 
cooperate with cartel activities in general. It also creates the temptation to make violent 
grabs for power or to change loyalties in return for bigger rewards.176 As a result of their 
need to inspire action that can create an internal threat, cartels are forced to consistently 
monitor the changes in internal behavior, severely curtailing the attention they can pay to 
diversifying their interests.  
C. CONCLUSION  
Using a combination of the Galbraith star framework, Mintzberg structural 
method, and Evan models, it is possible to break Mexican cartels down into an easily 
understood set of components. With these methods, cartels are shown to be simple 
entities, which use basic techniques to gain profit and maintain organizational cohesion. 
At the same time, it is easy to see them as an inherently limited organization. Despite 
their massive funds, extensive reach, and willingness to use violence, they remain for the 
most part constrained to certain illicit activities. 
 
                                                 
173 Alvarez, The History, Structure, and Organization of Mexican Drug Cartels, 22–26, 
174 Grillo, El Narco, 166. 
175 Kan, Cartels at War, 27. 
176 Ibid., 27–28. 
 42 
As will be shown in Chapter V, the Templarios broke the traditional mold of a 
highly centralized, yet limited criminal group. Aided by a narrative that connected and 
inspired members, the group transitioned to a more ambitious strategy. Freed from the 
constraints imposed by limited communications, self-interested personnel, and need for 
constant internal monitoring, moving quickly to control areas of society far beyond the 





V. ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS OF 
LOS CABALLEROS TEMPLARIOS  
Despite existing in a dynamic and dangerous environment, the organization of a 
drug cartel is defined by a few core elements. As stated in previous chapters, the 
organization of the Caballeros Templarios appeared in many ways similar to other 
cartels.
177
 However, its distinct narrative affected the cartel’s organization in a manner 
that fundamentally changed both the group’s long-term goals and its external interactions. 
In this chapter, we use the Galbraith star model, introduced in Chapter IV, to examine the 
Caballeros Templarios’ core organizational elements and the effect narrative has on each 
one. In doing, so we highlight the manner in which narrative and the core elements 
contributed to the group’s success and subsequent warlord status. 
A. NET-WARLORD STRATEGY 
As a drug cartel, the Caballeros Templarios end state was profit. As a result, the 
overall Templarios strategy became centered on the accumulation of power. Power would 
let it extract as much profit as possible from every available source: political, economic, 
and criminal.  
To these ends, the cartel expended a high degree of effort on co-opting and 
influencing both key government and business personnel and the general public as well. 
Instead of staying solely in methamphetamine production or drug trafficking, the 
Templarios extended its reach to include dictating agricultural production, iron ore sales 
to foreign governments, and the campaigns of local politicians.
178 
These activities, 
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combined with its aggressive information operations,179 expanded and “normalized 




Structurally, the predecessors of the Caballeros Templarios were similar to other 
cartels, possessing a leadership core that managed subordinate plaza cells through direct 
formalized links. Inadvertently though, the Templarios’ adoption of an ideological 
narrative imparted key differences in its structure. With a strong informal sense of 
identity and purpose that connected individual members, the Templarios were able to 
augment its formalized links, developing an all-channel “bucky-ball” form.181 As a result 
of taking on this structural form, the character and makeup of key leadership was affected 
and changed. Rather than concentrating group control among a few key individuals,182 
the Templarios divided leadership among several individuals, both publically known and 
deliberately concealed.183 This created a more flexible and resilient organization, capable 
of managing increasingly diverse enterprises.  
C. PROCESSES  
The Caballeros Templarios share the core processes of extortion, corruption and 
propaganda with other cartels.184 This concentration on a few, uncomplicated methods 
for producing profit allows Mexican cartels to exist, for the most part, as a kind of 
distasteful, yet tolerable evil.185 The Templarios, however, in line with its warlord 
strategy and narrative pursued extortion and corruption to a degree not seen in any other 
group. Moving beyond mere intimidation and low level bribery, it went as far as dictating 
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critical aspects of businesses and politics to generate maximum profit for the cartel.186 
This effectively turned regional government and industries into components of the 
Templarios cartel, directly affecting the lives of thousands of ordinary citizens and even 
the national economy.187  
Extortion, though common throughout Mexico, usually takes place at a relatively 
low level with criminals demanding payment from individual citizens in exchange for not 
harming people or property.188 In Michoacán, the Templarios used extortion to dictate 
the very output of local industries.189 This is of particular interest in Michoacán due to 
the fact that the state is home to some of the most productive mining, agriculture, and 
shipping industries in the country.190 Instead of demanding simple monetary payoffs 
alone, the Templarios also directed production rates, delivery schedules,191 and which 
customer base with which to engage.192 This change to the cartel’s core process 
significantly contributed to the Templarios subsequent downfall.  
Like extortion, corruption of government officials by the cartels is not uncommon 
in Mexico.193 For the most part, this corruption is to ensure protection from law 
enforcement and the ability to operate unhindered.194 The use of corruption by the 
Templarios was much more ambitious.195 In much the same way, that the cartel sought to 
control the industrial sector of Michoacán, the Templarios also sought control of social 
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and political institutions.196 In this way, it obtained not only freedom of maneuver, but 
the ability to directly control the lives of Michoacán citizens.197 Instead of paying the 
government off, it co-opted and slowly supplanted government authority. By sponsoring 
loyal candidates for elected office, ensuring the removal of opponents, and ensuring 
passage of favorable policy, the Templarios tightened control over people and business, 
and further subordinated every function of the region to the will of the cartel.198 
In line with its ideological narrative and the systematic corruption it sponsored, 
the Templarios showed an extreme interest in internal and external community 
support.199 This push largely took the form of providing services unavailable from the 
government or other legal institutions in the very rural region.200 It sponsored the 
development of numerous drug rehabilitation and religious study programs201 and 
regularly assisted disadvantaged people, all in line with its doctrine of promoting 
aggressive evangelical Christianity.202 These community activities served two important 
practical purposes. The first was as sources of highly impressionable recruits for the 
Templarios cause in the form of recovering addicts and social outcasts.203 The second 
was to build public support and acceptance for its activities.204 The community outreach 
of the Templarios garnered the cartel acceptance and support in Michoacán205 making its 
presence overt and acceptable. This encouraged citizens to view Templarios criminality 
as the exception to a pattern of overall benign behavior.  
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D. REWARDS 
The Templarios, by transitioning into the more complex and pressure-filled 
environment of state control, faced additional challenges to their organization.206 In 
response, they promoted the idea that their members served a higher purpose. The 
Caballeros Templarios supplemented typical cartel material rewards with ones 
specifically designed to improve the personal, spiritual, and social status of its members. 
By emphasizing its central role in the physical, moral, and spiritual security of 
Michoacán, the Templarios added a powerful sense of personal fulfillment to the rewards 
available to the group’s “Holy Warriors.”207 
As a result of this “holy mission,” the cartel expanded into atypical areas of focus. 
Templarios doctrine characterized members as virtuous soldiers earning divine favor by 
conducting cartel business and protecting Michoacán society.208 In members’ minds, 
these ideas entitled them to respect and absolute obedience. As a result of supposed 
removal of negative outside influences (drugs, other criminal groups, and unpopular 
government elements),209 Templarios earned a reputation as Robin-Hood-like defenders 
of the people.210 
The Templarios narrative layered on top of a pervasive, aggressive narcocultura 
created the perfect combination to inspire self-interested, ambitious warlords.211 In the 
end, it was also a cartel full of members motivated equally by both the temptation of 
wealth and infamy and a sense of righteous entitlement.212 This inevitably, led 
Templarios members to see themselves as the only true authority in the state of 
Michoacán.  
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Crafting a nativist message that appealed to the fiercely independent peoples of 
Michoacán and the surrounding regions, the Templarios recognized the importance of 
this core element to the success of its organization.213 The Templarios expanded its range 
of recruitment to a population normally overlooked by others. It specifically sought out 
individuals suffering from substance addiction and who wanted to improve their lives and 
who were eager for acceptance in a community.214 This provided the Templarios with the 
ability to both vet and indoctrinate potential members from the very start, inculcating 
them with a sense of obligation, loyalty, obedience, and a desire to carry out orders no 
matter what the effects or consequences.215 It also gained it access to a group particularly 
sensitive to the ideas of divinely inspired mission and open to the notion of expanding 
influence beyond mere criminal pursuits. 
In addition to the recruitment of disenfranchised youth and drug addicts, the cartel 
also had the advantage of recruiting from a population that was susceptible to the ideas 
promulgated by the Templarios. The state of Michoacán has long been known as a 
birthplace to revolutionaries. The design of the Templarios ideology and code of conduct 
reflected this spirit and resonated with the Michoacán population.  
F. LOS CABALLERO TEMPLARIOS: NETWARLORDS  
As depicted in Figure 5, the Templarios transitioned from the relatively simple 
cartel hub model to an intricate web-like structure.216 In this organization, normal 
formalized command and control relationships were supplemented by informal and 
ideological connections created by the Templarios’ narrative. This key addition made it 
into a version of the all-channel network described in netwar theory. The result was a 
significant change to both its behavior and capabilities. As an all-channel network- bound 
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together by a common sense of identity, the cartel was able to control increasingly varied 
and complex operations, including the administration of entire population centers.217  
 
Figure 5.  Modified Evan model showing the narrative linkages allowing the 
Templarios’ evolution into net-warlords 
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G. CONCLUSION  
Regardless of the fact that the Caballeros Templarios was a criminal organization 
that used ideology to further profits, the group’s skillful use of a narrative radically 
changed its end goals and enhanced its capabilities compared to similarly organized 
cartels. The Templarios’ information strategy is to link all members into a flexible, 
resilient, and mutually supportive network, inspiring warlord ambitions of total 
control.218 Using a powerful narrative and a supportive, adaptive structure, the 
Templarios were able to move faster and more effectively than their compartmentalized 
and hierarchical enemies.219 In the language of netwar, the Templarios moved well 
beyond a traditional cartel hub structure to a dangerous all-channel net-warlord model.  
  
                                                 
218 Arquilla and Ronfeldt “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” 9. 
219 Ibid., 15. 
 51 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARIZED FINDINGS 
This thesis focuses exclusively on how the application of netwar techniques 
allowed one particular group, the Caballeros Templarios cartel, to become the regional 
warlords of Michoacán, Mexico. With a structurally simple network and compelling 
narrative, this group managed to gain and maintain control of a complex environment. As 
depicted in Figure 6, the Templarios built on the already secure yet centralized hub 
models of preceding cartels, to create a highly decentralized, yet highly interconnected 
form. This hybrid method enables the cartel to maintain group cohesion and flexibility 
without the normal hub model limitations on spans of personal control.220 Instead of a 
single leader tightly managing self-interested subordinates, the network relied upon a 
council.221 In addition, it reinforced the loyalty of members through a combination of 
standard material reward and ideological indoctrination. This dual reward system 
replaces the need for the high centralization found in the typical hub form. The 
Templarios have transformed its structure from a relatively limited (if resilient) hub, to a 
potentially unlimited all-channel, bucky-ball model, capable of influencing every facet of 






                                                 
220 John Arquilla and David F Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, 
and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 7. 
221 Tribal Analysis Center, “Mexico’s Knight Templar and Code of Conduct Implications,” 
November, 2013, http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Codigo%20De%20Los%20Caballeros%20Templarios%20De%20Michoacan%20v1.pdf 




Figure 6.  The Caballeros Templarios exhibit the defining characteristics and 
behavior of a third generation, hybrid “all-channel” netwar actor  
in an attempt to achieve de facto warlord status in the  
Mexican state of Michoacán.223 
By creating a common sense of purpose and identity, the Templarios tied 
members together in a manner that resisted inherent Mexican cartel tendencies toward 
group fragmentation.224 This shared narrative, bolstered by militant catholic iconography 
and published code of conduct—extended from the core leadership to the lowest thug. 
Whether genuinely believed or not, the romantic idea of the Caballeros Templarios 
strengthened the bonds of the organization, keeping members “all of one mind.”225 As a 
result, even when dispersed and devoted to a variety of activities, it maintained a central 
conceptual and operational coherence.226 Empowered by a common world-view and 
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narrative, individual Templarios knew what was required of them. This enabled further 
decentralization and reactive, adaptive operations, even when under threat of severe 
violence.227  
In this thesis, net-warlords were defined as individuals (or groups) who 
successfully leverage the principles of netwar to obtain de-facto control over a 
geographic area thereby exerting total authority over politics, economics, and the 
application of violence. Unlike a traditional hierarchical criminal organization, which 
generally works outside the institutions of the state, the net-warlord seeks not to simply 
co-exist within the state, but to effectively co-opt the state if the opportunity arises, as its 
power increases and the state’s weakens. These information age warlords not only 
degrade a state’s hold over an area, but they also actively replace the state within the 
regions they control.  
Templarios’ ambitions, influenced by this narrative and capacity for control, were 
well beyond those of similar criminal organizations. Whatever ideas may have motivated 
their original formation (public defense or pure profit), the Templarios employed every 
means necessary to gain direct control over the political, social, and economic life of the 
state of Michoacán.228 Instead of common, albeit powerful, criminal kingpins, they were 
fully functional net-warlords, capable of dictating their will at every level of life in 
Michoacán. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The Templarios’ move from members of Michoacán’s criminal underworld to 
regional warlords has implications for the entire nation of Mexico. As a result of its 
activities, ultimately successful or not, similar cartels as well as any other ambitious 
entities have a blueprint to follow. Although the existence of influential cartels has been a 
fact of life for decades, there has never been such open usurpation of government 
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sovereignty.229 The fact that a criminal organization, even when regionally contained, can 
successfully challenge legitimate civil authorities will not go unnoticed. Indeed, in The 
Advent of Netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt specifically emphasize that criminal groups such 
cartels are already perfectly positioned to wage netwar.
230 
In their words, “They [cartels] 
are versatile and adaptable and have a proclivity to form odd alliances and partnerships 
that can penetrate legitimate political structures.”231  
The example that the Templarios have set in displacing local governments as the 
de facto authority within the state could inspire others to do the same. There is potential 
for other groups to see the incredible profits the Templarios reaped as a result of its 
power grab as the next logical step in their own evolution.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY 
Further study should focus on tracking the spread of Templarios net-warlord 
techniques to other related criminal groups in both the Central and South America. In 
addition, the network-versus-network success of the Michoacán vigilante groups against 
the Templarios deserves close analysis. Study of this response, its specific origins, its 
characteristics, and its repercussions may prepare governments and their security forces 
to respond to similar situations in the future.232 
For anyone seeking an example of how to create or enhance an organization 
capable of challenging the sovereignty of a state, the Caballeros Templarios stands out as 
a valuable case study. Demonstrating the power of netwar, it provides a blueprint for 
taking advantage of local conditions, structuring a group for maximum power and 
flexibility, and keeping individuals united toward common goals. It also serves as a 
warning for potential pitfalls by showing how a primarily self-interested group, no matter 
how superficially benign their narrative, can quickly lose support and power if it pushes a 
population too far. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
As a small, regionally specific criminal gang, the Caballeros Templarios faced a 
daunting task. In particular, they faced government and cartel opponents that possessed 
similar and often greater firepower, resources, and organizational effectiveness. None of 
the contenders involved could be defeated by the standard method of “plata o plomo” 
(silver or lead) or the application of bribery or violence. Even the extreme violence 
pioneered by Los Zetas cartel—really just standard techniques on a massive scale—failed 
to make any single cartel dominant.233 Without the ability to fight effectively using what 
could be labeled “conventional” methods, La Familia / Caballeros Templarios turned to 
an asymmetric solution: extreme doctrinal and organizational change. Combined with the 
conventional tools of violence and corruption, these changes (incorporating ideology and 
all-channel design) gave the Templarios the edge over their rivals and both the 
motivation and opportunity to seize power.234 
The Caballeros Templarios cartel represents a clear example of what is possible 
for an organization unified by strong guiding principles, and intent on violently 
maintaining total civil power in a region in defiance of nominal state authority.235 For six 
years, this infamous group was the de-facto ruler of an entire Mexican state. Using 
netwar strategies the Caballeros Templarios created a criminal parallel state, which has 
only recently encountered a serious threat to its existence. Though it was neither the first 
cartel to show some form of warlord potential, nor the only one currently challenging the 
Mexican state, the Caballeros Templarios cartel was the first to realize the means and 
methods to become fully developed net-warlords. 
 
                                                 
233 Kan, Cartels at War, 36. 
234 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 15–16. 
235 Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer. Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-state Actors, 123–125.  
 56 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 57 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Althaus, Dudley. “Can Vigilante Justice Save Mexico?” Global Post, February 3, 2013. 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/130201/mexi
co-vigilantes-law-justice-nieto-acapulco 
Althaus, Dudley, and Steven Dudley. “Mexico’s Security Dilemma: The Rise of 
Michoacán’s Militias.” Insight Crime. April 30 2014. 
http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/mexico-security-rise-militias-
michoacan  
Alvarez, Veronica Maria. The History, Structure, and Organization of Mexican Drug 
Cartels. El Paso: University of Texas at El Paso, 2006. 
Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt. The Advent of Netwar. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1996. 
———, eds. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.  
———, eds. “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited).” In Networks and Netwars: The Future 
of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001. 
Asfura-Heim, Patricio, and Ralph H. Espach. “The Rise of Mexico’s Self-Defense 
Forces.” Foreign Affairs, November 12, 2014. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139462/patricio-asfura-heim-and-ralph-h-
espach/the-rise-of-mexicos-self-defense-forces 
Becerril, Andrés. “Autodefensas dan origen a otro cártel; nace en Michoacán La Tercera 
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